1 While generally all contributors agree that systemic factors rather than the increased inflow of asylum-seekers caused the crisis, authors use different wordings. For instance, Thielemann refers to it as the "Syrian refugee crisis", focusing on the ongoing Syrian war and humanitarian crisis. While this crisis is the main reason for increasing asylum applications in Europe, the crisis is located in Syria and not in Europe. Jachtenfuchs and Genschel use the term 'refugee crisis' as the term most commonly used in public debates. Slominski and Trauner refer to the crisis as the 'migration crisis' for similar reasons, yet, highlighting that, from the perspective of states, migrants usually only become refugees once they receive official refugee status.
any asylum-seeker entering the Schengen area through their territory -broke down completely.
In other words '[it] collapsed under its own weight' (Menéndez, 2016, p. 397) .
With growing evidence that asylum-seekers were systematically detained and subject to degrading treatment in the by then top-recipient country Hungary, the German government unilaterally suspended the Dublin Regulation for Syrians in August 2015. Germany thereby admitting them into the national asylum system, irrespective of their first country of entry (Euractiv, 2015a) .
While the German chancellor had hoped that other Member States would follow her example, this expectation remained unfulfilled. One week later, she assured the German public that Germany could handle the large influx of refugees, saying "we can do this".
About two weeks later, the German government, pressured by a huge wave of arrivals in Bavaria, to some extents reversed its course by deciding to temporarily reinstate border controls at the internal Schengen border with Austria. This prompted a chain reaction, pushing several other EU countries, such as Austria, France, Denmark, and Sweden, to also introduce internal border controls in order to avoid becoming a "dead end" where 'unwelcome' refugees could get 'stranded' (Pastore and Henry, 2016, p. 54) . In October 2015, in response to the increased numbers of asylum-seekers and dissatisfied with EU efforts to coordinate external border control, Hungary took the drastic measure to erect a new fence along its borders to Croatia and Serbia. This step allowed Hungary to shift migration flows to neighbouring countries, particularly Slovenia (Trauner, 2016, p. 320) . This eventually led to a complete closure of the 'Balkan route', compelling tens of thousands of people to get stuck in Greece where they often had to live under devastating conditions (Weber 2016, p. 38) .
The deaths of thousands of migrants at Europe's external borders, and some of the measures taken in order to curb refugee flows to Europe, have cast doubts on the role of the EU as a promoter of human rights in the world. Meanwhile, the intense media attention and substantial politicization of the issue, along with the rise of populist forces, have put great pressure on the EU institutions and member governments to come up with solutions. Thus, the raison d'être, added-value and resilience of the European integration project have been increasingly called into question. Together with the Eurozone crisis, this crisis has the potential to seriously damage the overall project of EU integration. Against the background of 18 years of EU co-operation on asylum policies, the lack of a concerted approach in times of crisis is puzzling and leads us to assess the state of integration in this policy field.
The goal of this Special Issue is to provide a systematic assessment of the crisis. Given the fact that the crisis has only a recent history, contributions on this topic are limited so far. Most publications are either press reports (e.g. BBC News, 2016b; Kingsley, 2016) , or policy papers (Collet, 2015) and provide rather descriptive accounts, leaving ample room for more scholarly and theoretically informed analysis of the many facets of the crisis. This Special Issue provides a first comprehensive analysis of this topic, bringing together leading scholars working at the intersection of European integration and refugee studies, who discuss the most pertinent aspects of the crisis in a conceptually informed manner and apply/probe key theoretical approaches to the sequence of events. This Special Issue seeks to make a substantial empirical and theoretical contribution. In empirical terms, it advances original evidence in order to deepen our understanding of the crisis and how it has been managed. In theoretical terms, the Special Issue develops established and new theoretical accounts to analyse, explain and normatively assess European policy-making at a critical juncture of the EU's history. Before we delineate the individual contributions of the Special Issue as well as its broader conceptual contribution, we will briefly summarize and assess the EU's response to the crisis.
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Although the EU seemed to be caught rather unprepared by the crisis (Vătăman, 2016, p. 545) , EU institutions had focused on migration since spring 2015. In May 2015, the European Commission (2015a) had already presented its "European Agenda on Migration" which outlined both immediate measures to be taken in response to the crisis in the Mediterranean and steps to improve migration management in the coming years. In September 2015, the European Commission (2015b) put forward priority actions to implement the Agenda. This section outlines the proposed measures and, to some extent, reviews their state of implementation and, to a lesser extent, their appropriateness.
The following analysis focuses on measures responding to the arrival of asylum-seekers at the EU's external borders (through the introduction of hotspots), measures on responsibility-sharing 3 (through relocation and resettlement), policies of externalization (the EU-Turkey Statement), the redefinition of who is in need and has a right to asylum (through the introduction of new safe countries of origin), the prevention of irregular migration (through border control and measures against trafficking and smuggling), and stopping the departure of refugees from their home and transit countries (through the introduction of trust funds).
Internal dimension of the response -Hotspots
The EU decided to assist those Member States that had been facing the highest numbers of refugees at its external borders, namely Greece and Italy. The so-called "hotspot approach" aims at supporting the Member States in question by deploying Migration Management Support Teams that operate in five key areas: establishing functional hotspots, implementing the relocation decisions, ensuring the effective return of migrants not entitled to international protection, improving border management and creating sufficient and adequate reception capacity. To fulfil these tasks, the EU agencies Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Europol, and Eurojust provide operational support on the ground in cooperation with local authorities. Other Member States are required to meet the demand of sufficient experts and equipment to support these Migration Management Support Teams.
The agencies' tasks are supposed to be complementary to each other and they shall assist the Member States with the registration, identification, finger-printing and debriefing of asylumseekers, as well as with return operations. EASO teams help to manage the high amount of asylum claims. Frontex provides support in organizing the return of irregular migrants whose applications for asylum have been dismissed. Europol and Eurojust assist EU Member States in detecting networks of human smugglers and traffickers. The EU agencies only perform on the basis of existing hotspot structures. Financially supported by the EU, the Member States have to provide the sufficient infrastructure by themselves. The Commission regularly provides recommendations on and assessments of Member States' Action Plans and their implementations, but leaves the execution to them. The pressure on the 'frontline' states to implement EU policy has increased. They may no longer ignore EU rules on registration and finger-printing as specified in the Eurodac Regulation if they intend to profit from the relocation scheme (Trauner, 2016, p. 320) .
It seems that the hotspots -after substantially delayed construction and implementation -have considerably improved the rates of registration and finger-printing (Neville et al., 2016) .
However, there has been substantial criticism with regard to the hotspot approach and its implementation. For example: (1) the lack of a specific legal framework regulating the hotspot approach which challenges the fundamental rights of refugees (Menéndez 2016, p. 408) ; (2) the approach having failed to relieve the pressure from Greece and Italy as intended (ECRE et al., 2016) , which may be partly due to Member States not deploying enough experts for the Support Teams (European Commission, 2016a); (3) the chaotic conditions and poor services as to medication, food supply and accommodation (Human Rights Watch, 2016) ; (4) inadequate, unfair and/or repressive measures towards asylum-seekers, especially since the EU-Turkey Statement: many newly arrived asylum-seekers have been kept in prolonged detention without access to asylum procedures and have received inaccurate or incomplete information on the latter, or have been swiftly returned (ECRE et al. 2016) . Because of this practice, several NGOs left camps, which reportedly led to a worsening of conditions in the hotspots (Neville et al., 2016) .
Internal dimension of the response -Relocation and Resettlement
The so-called "temporary emergency relocation scheme" was introduced in September 2015.
Relocation refers to the transfer of persons in need of international protection from one EU Member State to another. The relocation scheme has been introduced to remedy the disproportionate responsibility put on those countries with EU external borders, particularly Greece and Italy. In the scheme, EU Member States committed themselves to relocate 160,000 people from Italy, and Greece by September 2017. The distribution of asylum-seekers is organized by a specific distribution key taking into account the size of the population (40%), the total GDP (40%), the average number of asylum applications over the previous four years (10%), and the unemployment rate (10%). The negotiations around the scheme were highly confrontational and several Eastern European Member States (especially the Czech Republic, Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia) opposed a compulsory temporary relocation scheme. They were subsequently outvoted in the Council, but Slovakia and Hungary filed a lawsuit over the decision at the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in November 2015 (Euractiv, 2015b . While the CJEU
has not yet come to a judgment, Advocate General Yes Bot opined in July 2017 that the legal actions brought forward by Slovakia and Hungary should be dismissed (CJEU, 2017).
The agreed scheme suffers from an implementation deficit. As of July 2017, only about 25% of persons have been relocated (European Commission, 2017a) . Only asylum-seekers from countries with an EU-wide recognition rate of 75% or higher qualify for relocation which makes it inapplicable to large numbers of asylum-seekers, particularly in Italy (Costello et al., 2017, p. 17, 20) . As Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have not relocated any asylum-seekers, the Commission (2017e) launched an infringement procedure against these states in June 2017.
Critics further argue that the scheme does not adequately include asylum-seekers' preferences as well as their personal, family, and economic circumstances and capabilities when determining the state of relocation (Ekathimerini 2015) . Similar to the Dublin system, this distribution mechanism expects asylum systems across the EU to provide protection standards and access to welfare on a comparable level. Yet, case law from both the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has demonstrated that some Member States fail to provide even basic standards (CJEU, 2011; ECtHR, 2014) .
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The temporary emergency relocation system diverts from the logic of the Dublin regulation and may be seen as a first effort by the EU towards sharing the responsibility for refugees among Member States. Given its temporary nature, it fails to establish a longer-term sustainable alternative to Dublin. As a result, in December 2015 deliberations began in the Council on a permanent relocation scheme based on the criteria of the temporary scheme outlined above (Bauböck, this volume; Thielemann, this volume; Zaun, this volume) . However, by early 2016 the talks were aborted as the opposition to such measures prevailed. As an alternative, the Commission launched a proposal for a "Dublin plus" regulation. Dublin plus maintains existing rules but includes a "corrective fairness mechanism", as a result of which refugees could be redistributed in times of crisis to take the pressure off 'frontline' states (2016b). Yet, this proposal also faces very substantial opposition among a majority of member governments. Consequently, the idea of 'flexible solidarity' was promoted by the Visgrad countries at the European Council at Bratislava in September 2016 (cf. Ministry of the Interior of the Republic Poland, 2016).
According to this proposal, the distribution of refugees would be voluntary. While some Member
States could take in refugees, others could instead contribute financial support or expertise. It remains to be seen in which direction a future agreement will go-if it will be adopted at all.
After the pictures of drowned refugees had dominated the press for several months, EU Member seeks to use it as a tool for persuading partner countries to agree on joint resettlement programmes on the basis of the 1:1 scheme along the lines of the EU-Turkey statement (Menéndez 2016, p. 406) .
External dimension of the response -EU-Turkey Statement
Confronted with the relative failure of the internal measures taken to solve the challenges of the crisis, the EU simultaneously tried to find external solutions. The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 that is at the heart of this strategy (Slominski and Trauner, this volume) and registered deaths and missing persons in the Aegean Sea went down by 94%. The relative impact of the EU-Turkey Statement has, however, been questioned since it concurred with the closure of the Western Balkans route, coverage of poor reception conditions in Greece, and the introduction of internal border checks by some EU countries (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017, p. 4) . Moreover, monthly arrivals in Greece had been declining prior to the EU-Turkey Statement already (Spijkerboer, 2016) . One reason for this might be the approaching winter and the deteriorating weather conditions. Furthermore, the low number of returns (1,826) has not been adopted as part of the EU architecture. It is a political deal issued by the heads of state and government of the EU Member States and Turkey. Therefore, EU institutions cannot be held accountable for it which circumvents the usual checks and balances present in the EU framework, such as scrutiny of the CJEU (Carrera et al., 2017) . Moreover, merely some elements, i.e. those regarding the return of migrants, are founded on binding readmission agreements. The statement became a blueprint for similar deals, notably with Afghanistan and Mali. As a result, they are not subject to EP scrutiny or judicial review by the CJEU. Therefore, people directly affected by these agreements cannot contest them in front of the EU courts (Koenig and WalterFranke, 2017, p. 2; Carrera et al., 2017) .
The longevity of the EU-Turkey Statement may be questioned as the 'carrots' of visa liberalization and accession have mostly been put on ice following the repressive backlash in Turkey and also in view of the mounting threats by the Turkish government to abort the agreement.
External & Internal dimension of the response -Safe Countries of Origin
In September 2015 the Commission proposed a regulation establishing a common EU list of safe countries of origin. 4 This list is supposed to initially comprise seven countries whose nationals account for around 17% of the total number of asylum applications filed in the EU: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. The goal is to "accelerate" asylum applications from citizens of countries considered 'safe'. At present, safe countries of origin are defined by national uncoordinated lists.
This is likely to have contributed to different recognition rates of comparable asylum applications (EP, 2017, p. 3-5) .
It is unclear how the fast-track approach is supposed to work in practice if Member States are still obliged to carry out an individual examination complying with the basic guarantees established in
Chapter II of the asylum procedures directive in order to give the applicant the chance to disprove the assumption of safety. Granting protection to a citizen from an alleged safe country of origin is possible. However, in such case the applicant is required to rebut the presumption of safety and demonstrate the individual need for protection (EP, 2017, p. 4) .
ECRE (2015) has suggested that the proposed regulation will in practice tend to considerably curtail asylum-seekers' rights to appeal a negative decision and to lawfully remain in the country where an application is lodged during a pending appeal. A standardized EU list may consequently lead to harmonization on the lowest common denominator in protection standards (also cf.
Amnesty International, 2015).
It is highly questionable whether Turkey in particular can be regarded as a safe country of origin.
In 2014, the percentage of well-founded asylum applications from Turkey in the EU amounted to over 23% (European Commission, 2017b) . The EU-Turkey Statement suggests that "all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands" are returned to Turkey "in full accordance with EU and international law", citing the asylum procedures directive. However, serious criticism has been raised on applying the concept to Turkey based on evidence of increased push-back practices, serious obstacles for asylum-seekers including torture and degrading treatment, and the fact that Turkey applies the 1951 Geneva Convention to refugees originating from Europe only (Peers and Roman, 2016) . Additionally, the numbers of asylum applications from Turkish citizens in Europe have also increased since the failed coup d'état of July 2016 when the government adopted severe measures against military personnel, judges, and some government officials (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2017) . Moreover, the EU has tripled its budget on "Triton" and "Poseidon" since June 2015, thus reverting the cuts from the above-mentioned abolition of Mare Nostrum (Menéndez, 2016, p. 397 
External dimension of the response -Trust funds
To diminish further migration flows, the EU has built up several trust funds of which three are the most important:
( Its initial budget amounts to 64 million Euro as provided by the EU, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands (European Commission, 2017d).
The need for long-lasting and sustainable support for the neighbouring countries of Syria can be drawn from looking at the numbers. Whereas Lebanon has hosted 1.1 million Syrian refugees in addition to about 450,000 refugees from Palestine in 2015, at the same time 2.7 million refugees have been counted in Jordan, including over 2 million Palestinians and about 665,000 Syrians.
Furthermore, the refugee population in Turkey has risen to more than 3 million in 2016
(Amnesty International 2016b, pp. 9-10). These countries are in severe need of financial and operational support. The EU Trust Funds are therefore one (relatively substantial) measure of European development policy. Den Hertog (2016, p. 13) raises suspicion that the actual arrangements and priorities under these funds might rather serve the EU's short-term security interests.
Towards a centralization of EU asylum policy?
Harmonisation of asylum policies in the EU has barely led to the implementation of minimum protection standards in the EU, let alone common standards (Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014;
Den Heijer et al., 2016) . In the wake of the crisis, it became clear that the lack of harmonization of asylum legislation had (significantly) contributed to the crisis, not least in terms of prompting differing/diverging migratory pressures across the EU. Since late 2015, the Commission has reacted by launching proposals for a third generation of EU asylum related legislation, with the new Dublin IV regulation at the heart, but also important proposals on asylum procedures, The previous sections have demonstrated that the EU's response to the crisis has been more comprehensive than commonly perceived. However, still much depends on the degree to which the Commission's proposals will be agreed and eventually implemented. So far, the EU has made most (effective) efforts with regard to limiting migration flows into Europe, while progress in terms of a fair and long-term distribution of refugees and addressing the root causes of migration is rather mixed. In addition, security-oriented measures have dominated over measures to ensure the protection of human and civil rights of asylum-seekers.
Contribution of this Special Issue
After having presented and assessed the EU's response to the crisis, we now turn to the contribution of the Special Issue. We will first summarise the core arguments of the contributions to this Special Issue and discuss how they contribute to our understanding of the crisis, before we turn to its overall contribution to the understanding of EU policy-making and EU integration as well as to theories of European integration.
Explaining the relatively poor internal response to the crisis
The Special Issue provides an explanation for the relatively poor internal response to the crisis especially when it comes to the introduction of mechanisms to ensure responsibility-sharing.
According to Thielemann, the absence of effective cooperation on this issue can be explained through the public good characteristics of asylum cooperation which have influenced EU decision-making in this area for the last eighteen years. States consider refugee protection a zerosum game and hence have almost no incentives to cooperate in this area. This entails moral hazard dynamics and situations where some big Member States -such as Germany, that can make an impact of scale and have the capacity of receiving more refugees -take larger shares, while smaller Member States engage in free-riding and refrain from contributing to responsibilitysharing.
Drawing on liberal intergovernmentalism, Zaun shows that the introduction of permanent refugee quotas failed due to asymmetrical interdependence and the presence of Suasion Game dynamics. While only few Member States received large numbers of asylum applications and perceived the quota system as an opportunity to divert refugee flows, the vast majority of Member States only had a low intake of asylum-seekers and were not ready to engage in responsibility-sharing as this would have implied receiving a larger share. The growing influence of populist parties both in top-recipient countries such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden, as well as the fact that populist parties were in government in the Visegrad countries further politicised the issue and account for the confrontational style of debates at the EU level.
Jachtenfuchs and Genschel point out that certain public goods (Thielemann, this volume) and bargaining problems (Zaun, this volume) are, in fact, endogenous to a certain substantive area of integration, namely to core state powers. Their key argument is that the integration of core state powers involves the allocation of limited public resources rather than the imposition of potentially unlimited public rules on private market actors. This implies tough distributive conflicts (since every Euro can only be spent once) and higher politicization (because citizens care for their collective patrimony). Hence, the problem is that Member States seek increased
European integration without a system of 'burden-sharing' (i.e. mutual insurance). This does not work in core state powers except for very benign circumstances, i.e. no refugees coming in the first place.
Responsibility-shifting and externalising refugee flows: A viable solution?
Given the absence of an effective response to internal redistributive challenges, the EU needed to find alternative venues to respond to pressures resulting from the inflow of asylum-seekers.
These include an externalisation of refugee flows. The adoption of the ECBG was a clear step into this direction, as the strengthening of border protection implies responsibility-shifting towards third countries outside the EU. Arguably, the EU institutions were able to take much stronger actions in the external dimension of EU asylum policy than internally, because there was a common interest among the Member States for more integration. More integration in border management would redistribute asylum-seekers to third countries, whereas the introduction of permanent refugee quotas would have implied an internal redistribution from which some Member States would obviously benefit more than others.
Applying neofunctionalist explanations, Niemann and Speyer demonstrate that the crisis revealed the existing dysfunctionalities of the system, especially between a supranational Schengen and an intergovernmental external border regime and has thus acted as a catalyst for further sovereignty transfers in the area of border protection and the introduction of the ECBG. Several path dependencies such as the political and sunk costs of Schengen disintegration blocked the possibility for a spillback. Supranational institutions, socialized civil servants, transnational promigrant interest groups, and European business associations contributed to translating these pressures into an increased breadth and depth of integration in this area, while falling short of reaching a genuinely supranational solution. However, arguing counterfactually, without the crisis and the severe pressures on the Schengen regime, this policy reform would not have occurred in the nearer future, as Member States had usually been reluctant to transfer substantive powers to a shared border agency in this sensitive area of national sovereignty.
Yet, as Ripoll Servent underlines, delegation towards the EBCG and EASO was not a symmetrical process in which all Member States participated to the same extent. Drawing on Principle-Agent arguments, she instead demonstrates that these agencies have been strengthened to address the severe and continuous deficiencies of the asylum and border protection systems of weak regulating states, particularly Italy and Greece. These agencies are now supposed to close regulatory gaps and enforce policies on the ground in weak regulating states. The crisis has therefore reinforced the power asymmetries between strong and weak regulators as it led to decisions through which the regulatory model of the strong regulators in the North will be imposed on the weak regulators in the South, which previously had a more informal asylum regime in place. Thus, Ripoll Servent uncovers the complex forms of agencification in this policy area, drawing attention to cleavages between the different Member States of whom only some act as principals delegating to EU institutions to control their fellow Member States.
Again, this approach obviously fails to address the key deficiencies of the CEAS identified above.
Instead, it perpetuates the North's attempts to shift responsibility towards the South by, first, establishing functioning asylum systems in 'frontline' states to make them receive more asylumseekers and, second, introducing stronger border protection in these states which eventually shifts the responsibility to countries outside of Europe.
While responsibility was shifted towards other Member States and third countries, Member States could not shift the blame for higher application numbers to the inefficiencies of the EU. Even though European publics these days are often assumed to be easily manipulated by Eurosceptic politicians who shift the blame for national policy failure to the EU, Harteveld et al. (this volume) argue that publics see through the blame-game of domestic politicians and are aware that the poor crisis response cannot be blamed solely on the EU but that Member States are also partially responsible. They demonstrate that the number of asylum applications in the EU and the media attention this generates primarily affect Euroscepticism, whereas the number of asylum applications into each Member State affects attitudes towards national institutions and governments.
Informal venues and new policy frames as a means of bypassing humanitarian responsibilities
To bypass its humanitarian responsibilities, the EU has increasingly relied on informal decisionmaking structures and new policy frames when externalising refugee flows.
Slominski, and Trauner show that although the crisis has not fundamentally changed return policies in Europe, it has influenced them in two significant ways: first, EU Member States are more determined to render return policies more effective through closing loopholes and interpreting the existing rules more rigorously. Second, the crisis has contributed to a stronger reliance on informal patterns of cooperation with the aim of evading institutional and legal constraints. The EU-Turkey Statement was a case in point. It externalised migration control, shifting the responsibility to assess asylum claims onto a third country (Turkey), and it informalized return policy. The 'non-usage' of the EU, they conclude, hence provided avenues for bypassing and undermining institutional and legal constraints that a usage of the EU's supranational architecture would have implied.
Although the EU has developed an increasing number of safeguards to protect the human rights of migrants, there is clearly a tendency to circumvent the established institutional context to pursue restrictive and even human rights violating practices. Member States, it seems, tend to use perceived legal grey-zones to ensure greater flexibility to respond to new needs.
Moreno-Lax also provides evidence of this constant struggle of EU actors to exploit perceived legal grey-zones and normative gaps, often by reframing the challenges to be addressed and thus the acceptable responses. She shows that -under pressures to comply with human rights norms -Frontex and related border operations have relied increasingly on the invocation of human rights to de facto curtail the rights of migrants trying to enter EU territory. Search and rescue operations which in fact have few other goals than preventing migrants from accessing EU territory are now framed as life-saving devices.
The EU as the lesser evil? Comparing global and regional responsibility-sharing and reflecting on potential solutions
While the EU's internal response to rising numbers of asylum applications was relatively poor, the fact that it came up with a temporary relocation mechanism shows that the EU is still much more capable of ensuring some forms of responsibility-sharing than the UN. The UN Global
Compact on Refugees underlines the need for cooperation, yet, it does not make any concrete suggestions on how to tackle it.
While at the European level there are few incentives for cooperation, Bauböck reminds us that the EU context is still the single most favourable context for cooperation on these issues and much more favourable than the United Nations, precisely because of functional and normative pressures resulting from Schengen and the persistence of cooperation between EU Member
States. To ensure a distribution that is both fairer for states and ensures that the largest number of these in need of protection receive it, Bauböck supports suggestions for tradable refugee quotas (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport, 2014; Jones and Teytelboym, 2016 ) that pay significant consideration also to the preferences of refugees. Otherwise, such a system is likely to fail in an area of free movement like Schengen. The advantage of having tradable quotas, moreover, is that countries that completely oppose receiving refugees still contribute. However, in contrast to suggestions currently debated at the EU level, Bauböck proposes that the price per refugee should not be fixed, but ought to reflect the costs the exclusionary preferences of some Member States have on the other Member States.
The bigger picture: What the CEAS crisis tells us about the state of European integration and its theories
Scholars of European integration increasingly take the view that theories used for conceptualising
European integration tend to be complementary rather than competing with each other (Dietz and Wiener 2009; Ioannou et al. 2015) . This view is confirmed through the analyses of the Special Issue.
Beyond the broad distinction between some approaches advanced in this volume being more explanatory -liberal intergovernmentalism (Zaun) , neofunctionalism (Niemann and Speyer), collective action (Thielemann), principal-agent analysis (Ripoll Servent), political attitude research (Harteveld et al.) , the comparative analysis of core state powers (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs) -and others being more interpretative (Slominski and Trauner) and normative (Moreno-Lax as well as Bauböck), one can also detect different "domains-of-application" (Jupille et al., 2003, p. 22) within these broad distinctive categories. In the following, we will focus on the different domains of application, i.e. the specific foci, of each of the explanatory approaches.
All of these approaches explain the absence of integration, yet, they highlight different aspects of it. Collective action can best explain the basic underlying incentive structures which explain both ineffective cooperation and why some Member States are ready to take on disproportional responsibilities. But collective action approaches do not zoom into domestic preference formation and EU negotiation processes to show how they interlink and how power differentials between Member States impact on EU legislative output. This is instead done by liberal intergovernmentalism.
The Special Issue shows that also the old antagonists, liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are compatible. The key difference is that liberal intergovernmentalism opens the black box of domestic preference formation and closely investigates national constraints as well as power dynamics between actors in EU negotiations whereas neofunctionalism instead focuses on the role of the supranational actors (especially the European Commission) and functional pressures used by these actors to promote policy innovation and overcome (minor) constraints. While it disentangles these constraints and Council decision-making dynamics to a lesser extent, it provides deeper insights into the other side of the coin, namely the strategic action of supranational actors.
Principal agent theories also focus on motivations and preferences and try to explain policy outcomes. However, their focus is on explaining instances where powers are delegated to EU institutions (in the case investigated here only those of the weak regulators whose compliance with EU policies is thus being ensured). In future research, it would be interesting to see if this type of asymmetric delegation that Ripoll Servent finds on both EASO and the ECBG is part of a wider trend across policy areas or just a specific characteristic of EU asylum policy-making. (Bickerton et al., 2015) . It seems that Member States are strongly aware of the national and international (legal) constraints they themselves and their fellow Member States are subject to. Where common positions are easy to find, Member States happily act within the EU framework as the case of the EBCG has demonstrated. Where these cannot be found (e.g. on the redistribution of refugees and responsibility-sharing), alternative venues are searched for. A point in case is the EU-Turkey Statement which was conceived by a few Member States with the support of the Commission. As it was not decided within the EU institutional framework, it is not considered an authoritative EU act by the CJEU. This is highly problematic. Scholars have shown that the EU legal and institutional framework has provided additional constraints for policy-makers who aim to restrict domestic asylum policies (Slominksi, 2013; Zaun, 2017, p. 24) . By opting for new intergovernmental settings, Member States are again able to evade these constraints and legal guarantees and adopt policies which are normatively highly questionable (see Slominski and Trauner; Moreno Lax 
